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Abstract 
This paper develops a measure of social capital based on economic relationships and 
analyzes its effects on growth. Investment in social capital is modeled by using the 
conceptual framework for measuring physical capital services. The measure of social 
capital depends on expectations of income, its investment cost, inequality in society, the 
density of trust networks, the size of the social network and the rate of depreciation of 
social capital. With this methodology a database is constructed for 23 OECD countries 
covering the period 1970-2001 and the positive effect of social capital on economic 
growth is tested.  
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Resumen 
Este trabajo desarrolla una medida del capital social basada en las relaciones 
económicas y analiza sus efectos sobre el crecimiento económico. La inversión en 
capital social se modeliza utilizando el marco conceptual aplicado en la medición del 
capital físico. El indicador del capital social obtenido depende de las expectativas de 
ingresos, del coste de su inversión, de la desigualdad existente en la sociedad, de la 
densidad de las redes de confianza y de la tasa de depreciación del capital social. A 
partir de esta metodología se construye una base de datos para 23 países de la OCDE 
que cubre el periodo 1790-2001 con la que se contrasta el positivo papel del capital 
social sobre el crecimiento económico. 
 
Palabras clave: Capital social, Inversión, Redes sociales, Crecimiento económico 
 
                                                 
∗ This paper is a result of the Social Capital Project, of the BBVA Foundation and the Ivie.  
 2
 
The literature on social capital, which has grown exponentially during recent 
years1, reveals an imbalance between the volume of publications and the relative lack of 
progress in measuring the concept. Given the quantitative tradition of Economics, this 
contrast is even more striking, as economists have not so far made any significant 
methodological contribution to the measurement of social capital.  
The measures of social capital most often used are those formulated by political 
scientists and sociologists based on Putnam measures of associative density (Putnam, 
Leonardi, Nanetti and Pavoncello, 1983; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Putnam, 
1995) and on indices of trust obtained from general surveys (WVS by Inglehart2, GSS, 
etc.). The main weakness of these two approaches is that the relation between the 
concept of social capital and the variable used to measure it (voluntary membership of 
groups or associations in the first case, and the manifestation of the degree of trust in 
others in the second) has not been established in such a way that enables us to identify a 
process of investment from which a capital stock is derived. Without this relation, any 
measure of capital would be imprecise and its meaning uncertain. 
Methodological developments in the measurement of social capital from an 
economic standpoint have been very limited. Some recent studies model investment in 
social capital by adopting the general approach used in the measurement of other kinds 
of capital and consider its value as an asset equivalent to the present value of the 
expected future income (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter, 2000; Glaeser, 
2001; Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote, 2002). No empirical estimations have yet been 
derived from this approach, even though they would give us a more precise 
understanding of the significance of the most frequent measures. Traditionally used 
measures suffer from serious limitations in their use in causality analysis, given the 
weakness of their foundations (Durlauf, 2002). 
Starting from a conception of social capital similar to that in the studies cited in 
the above paragraph, the main objective of this paper is to develop a methodology for 
measuring social capital analogous to that employed in measuring other assets. Capital 
is a durable asset, the result of a costly investment, which depreciates and is valuable 
because it offers services or benefits of some kind. Taking this into account, both the 
theoretical and empirical elements of the method proposed for measuring social capital 
will be developed. The approach stresses the economic aspect in two senses: first, by 
                                                 
1 Winter (2000) enumerates more than a thousand articles on the subject between 1996 and 1999. 
2 See Inglehart, Basáñez, Díez-Medrazo, Halman and Luijkx (2004). 
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modeling social capital as a result of a process of investment or accumulation, which 
responds to the logic of maximizing individuals’ expected benefits; and second, by 
considering that economic relationships are fundamental to the generation of social 
capital in developed economies, i.e. that economic relationships are part of the present 
social structure. 
The proposed measure of the stock of social capital is based on two pillars. On 
the one hand, we start from an optimum decision-making model of the investment and 
accumulation process in social capital. Secondly, we use the conceptual framework 
developed for the measurement of physical capital services (OECD, 2001), which 
identifies the relevant variables to obtain a measure of productive capital. The 
methodology developed is applied to a broad set of countries for which the endowments 
of social capital during the period 1970-2001 are estimated. Lastly, with this data we 
evaluate the importance of social capital in economic growth, replicating the extension 
of the Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) model devised by Islam (1995). The objective 
is to examine whether the measure proposed explains part of the economic growth of 
the countries in the sample. Our findings confirm this to be the case. 
The paper is structured as follows. The fist section sets out the approach used 
and describes the principal assumptions on which the proposed measure of social capital 
is based. In the second section we develop the theoretical model, from which we obtain 
an expression that allows the aggregated social capital stock of an economy to be 
proxied. The third section describes the empirical approach to the variables posited by 
the theoretical model as determinants of the stock of social capital. The fourth section 
presents the main features of the evolution of social capital in the economies analyzed, 
according to the estimations carried out. The fifth section tests whether the measure 
developed is capable of explaining economic growth and the sixth section concludes. 
 
1. Economics and social capital 
Only some approaches consider social capital to be a resource that accumulates 
as a consequence of decisions taken by rational agents who invest in it. From this 
rationalist perspective, measuring social capital requires us to identify how the process 
of investment operates. Although some of the most influential contributions to the 
concept of social capital in the sphere of sociology and political science underline its 
condition as a productive asset (Bordieu, 1980, 1985; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Putnam et 
al., 1983, 1993; Putnam 1995), most contributions refer to capital in a generic sense. 
They affirm that social relationships create value and that it is possible to invest in a 
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network of relationships, but the precise quantification of this process of investment is 
not the prime interest of their studies. 
The economic literature on social capital has not covered this gap, and the lack 
of a precise methodology for measuring social capital means that most empirical studies 
start from vague definitions of the concept (Durlauf, 2002). The literature pays much 
more attention to the effects of social relationships on the results obtained by economies 
than to the role of economic relationships in the generation of social capital. In the 
studies of the economic consequences of social capital, interest focuses on its effects on 
growth, efficiency and productivity (Knack and Keefer, 1996; La Porta, López de 
Silanes, Shleifer and Wishny, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2002; Sobel, 2002). 
These insufficiencies are more likely to be alleviated if economic relationships 
are considered as an important part of the social relationships that represent the source 
of social capital. We start from the hypothesis that advances in the living conditions 
enjoyed by developed societies generate expectations of improvement and favorable 
mutual treatment among their members. Since these relationships are frequent (even 
more usual than other social relationships), more attention should be paid to them as 
generators of social capital than has been the case hitherto. 
According to the interdisciplinary definition of social capital proposed by the 
Social Capital Interest Group of the University of Michigan (SCIG, 2001), social 
capital is the result of social relationships and consists of the expectation of benefits 
derived from preferential treatment between individuals or groups. In other words, the 
social relationships that produce expectations of favorable behavior in other agents are 
an asset that produces different types of effects. 
What are the reasons for the privilege hitherto given to the non-economic 
dimension (the family and voluntary associations) in the study of trust and social 
capital, from a macroeconomic perspective? Why have economic relationships not been 
considered to generate expectations of favorable treatment? Possibly one reason is that 
many economists have not shown much interest in a concept that forces them to 
reconsider the stylized versions of human behavior that they habitually deal with, 
focused on individualism and on rational agents that exchange goods or equivalent 
assets within a context of complete information. However, as Spence (2002) points out, 
in very substantial markets, such as those for durable goods, labor or finance, 
information is incomplete and trust plays an important role. Alongside this, repeated 
relationship between individuals is also present within economic organizations in which 
the asymmetries of information and uncertainty are also present. A direct consequence 
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of these circumstances is that agents feel influenced by what others do when making 
decisions. For this reason, psychological and sociological factors become important, as 
do concepts such as cognitive bias, impartiality, reciprocity, group identity, gregarious 
behavior or social status (Akerlof, 2002). 
Many authors on social capital, when stressing the determining role of social or 
political institutions and social relationships in the early phases of capital accumulation, 
have highlighted that Economics does not sufficiently recognize these aspects. Although 
this is true, it does not mean that non-economic social relationships are the exclusive 
source for the generation of social capital (as most of the literature seems to assume), 
nor that the importance of economic and non-economic relationships as the basis of 
trust will remain unchanged throughout the different phases of economic development. 
On the contrary, it is very important to pay attention to the capacity of economic 
exchanges to generate social capital in the advanced phases of development in 
economies with extensive experience of continued progress. This is recognized by part 
of the recent literature on the evolution of social capital in developed countries and 
approaches by some economists to the problem (Stiglitz, 1999). 
Following this approach, investment in social capital is modeled in this article on 
the basis of three basic hypotheses: 
1. Cooperation is favored by the economic incentives deriving from the 
expected increasing income resulting from continued growth. Past 
experiences of social and economic progress are projected into the future and 
become individuals’ expectations of favorable treatment. 
2. Individuals’ incentives to cooperate are strengthened/weakened by two 
factors: a) by the effective opportunities for participation in the results 
(higher if income inequality is restricted by social practices and policies of 
cohesion); and b) by a culture of fulfillment of duty or of reciprocity that is 
increased and transmitted through access to education and the improvement 
of the population’s human capital. 
3. The effects of cooperation are extended if the density of the trust relationship 
networks between individuals is high. This density of trust relations is 
favored by the smooth running of long term economic relationships when 
uncertainty is inevitable and information costs are high, such as employment 
and financial relationships and the markets for durable goods. 
 6
2. The measurement of social capital: the theoretical model 
In this section we develop the methodology used to obtain a measure of social 
capital. This revolves around two basic references. The first is the study by Glaeser, 
Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) in which they present a theoretical framework for the 
analysis of the determinants of social capital. This starts from the analysis of both the 
consideration of how social capital is formed using a model of optimal individual 
investment decisions and of the social capital accumulation process. 
The second reference in our framework is the measuring of social capital in a 
similar way to physical capital (OECD, 2001). According to this methodology, once the 
investment decision and the accumulation of the net stock of social capital (wealth) 
have been analyzed, their productive contribution must be quantified by means of the 
flow of services. The flow of services from social capital depends on the degree of 
relation in the social relationships network. The aggregation of social capital across 
individuals poses problems similar to those faced in aggregating different assets of 
physical capital, which can be solved with the help of the appropriate prices (the user 
cost of capital). We thus obtain an expression for aggregated social capital which is a 
function of a set of variables that will permit us to empirically estimate the social 
capital. 
2.1. The individual decision to invest in social capital 
Glaeser et al. (2002) consider social capital as a characteristic associated directly 
with individuals, resulting from a process of investment and accumulation. Therefore 
the optimal investment Is in social capital ks of an individual i results, like any decision 
on investment in assets, from solving the problem of maximization of future (net) 
income expected by the investor. Consequently, to analyze social capital it is necessary 
to begin by making hypotheses about the income that an individual receives and the 
costs borne as a result of his investment in social capital. 
If the individual possesses social capital he will expect to obtain, in the course of 
the years stretching from the present time to a horizon T, an income π over and above 
what he would obtain in other circumstances or with other conduct. The horizon T 
defines his expectations in respect of the duration of his economic relationships within 
that society or social network, which may be permanent, very long-lasting, or less long-
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lasting3. If his expectations are disappointed and the expected income is not obtained, 
his ks will depreciate at a rate of d4. 
We assume that the employed population represents the reference group of 
individuals, because they participate more intensely than other groups in economic 
relationships in their two roles, as workers and as economic decision makers in their 
families. As payment for his investment in social capital, the individual will earn a part 
of the income obtained, y, added to the remuneration for factors he contributes to the 
productive system (physical capital, human capital and labor). Furthermore, in his 
valuation of net expected income the individual takes into account the risk that this may 
not be achieved. In view of existing inequality, of the risks that he takes on is that of 
being excluded from the results of society and earning below the average income. By 
considering income and inequality simultaneously we assume that the individual takes 
the level of well-being provided by this society as a reference for his incentives to 
cooperate. By considering the well-known properties of the Gini index (G)5, we 
calculate well-being as the income that everybody would enjoy if there were no 
inequality: y(1-G). 
With regard to the costs associated with investment in social capital, the cost of 
cooperating, measured by its equivalent in time worked, is denoted by C(Is). For risk-
averse individuals this cost is assumed to be increasing and, from a certain point 
onwards, convex (C’(Is)>0 and C’’(Is)>0). Also, if the opportunity cost of the time 
dedicated to cooperating by a worker can be proxied by the wage w 6, the direct cost 
attributed to investment in social capital will be w C(Is).  
At the present time (t=0) the individual plans his future path of investments in 
social capital up to the last period (t=T) in such a way that he invests in social capital if 
the expected returns are greater than the costs associated with it. Therefore, given the 
social rate of discount ρ, investment in social capital occurs when the expected net 
value is positive: 
                                                 
3 See in Di Pasquale and Glaeser (1998) the importance given to the duration of relationships in the study 
of the impact on social capital of home ownership and its effect on the permanence of individuals in a 
location. 
4 Ostrom (1999) and Sobel (2002) consider that social capital does not depreciate, but appreciates with 
use. These authors point out that if the use of social capital produces good results, these will act as an 
incentive to new investment in social capital and, in this way, social capital increases. But in this, social 
capital would be no different from physical capital, in which more is invested if it is seen to be 
productive. 
5 See the discussion in Sen and Foster (1997), chapter 2. 
6 The reserve wage w  is considered to include both the remuneration of labor and that of human capital. 
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where k is the stock of physical capital per employee and r is the return of capital. 
To decide his optimal Is in each period, the individual must solve the following 
maximization problem, taking as given the endowments of physical capital and labor of 
the rest of society, on which the income generated, yt depends (see paragraph 2.5 
below). 
 [ ] ( ) ( )( )0,...,
0
1 (1 1
(1 )it T
T
tIs it it itt
t
Max y G rk w C Isπ ρ∈ =
⎡ ⎤= − − − +⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦∑  (2) 
 1  it it itks ks Isδ+ = + . (3) 
Condition (3), which regulates the temporal evolution of social capital, is 
derived from the rhythms of investment and depreciation and the corresponding survival 
rate of investment, δ=(1-d), of ks accumulated in the past. The individual’s stock of 
social capital is therefore the result of the accumulation of the corresponding investment 
flow over time. 
2.2. The productivity of social capital: efficiency and social cohesion 
As with other factors of production, to evaluate the contribution of capital assets 
to production we have to focus not on the stock itself, but on the flow of services 
provided by that capital. The productivity of social capital and its influence on costs and 
output derives from the services that this capital provides when it is used. The services 
of social capital consist of the reduction of transaction and supervision costs in the 
activities in which they are potentially most important because of problems of 
asymmetrical information and uncertainty. The capacity of an individual’s social capital 
to perform services will depend on the relationships of mutual trust that he establishes 
with others, through which these costs are reduced. 
As mentioned above, in drawing up the frame of reference to obtain a measure 
of the stock of social capital we were guided by the methodology used in the 
measurement of physical capital stock which, to measure capital services, proceeds in 
two stages. The first consists of converting assets of a certain type into standard units of 
efficiency to correct the effect of ageing on the productivity of the equipment. The 
second, to which we will refer later, combines the efficiency units corresponding to 
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different assets in an aggregated index, weighting the services of each one of them by 
their respective user costs7. 
In the first stage, the conversion of a capital asset into standard units of 
efficiency requires us to consider the following two aspects: 
a. The temporal profile of the accumulated investments and how they are 
affected by the loss of efficiency due to the passage of time, normal use and 
obsolescence. In the case of physical assets, the differences in productivity 
of the various vintages of capital are captured by the age-efficiency profile, 
resulting from a combination of hypotheses concerning the average life of 
the asset and the functional form of the loss of efficiency. However, in the 
case of social capital we do not consider there to be necessarily any reason 
for this loss to occur with the passage of time, so it would make no sense to 
attribute a stable average life to social capital, although it could be assumed. 
Alternatively, the hypothesis for dealing with this problem is to assume that 
loss of efficiency will occur if the trust accumulated by the individual is 
disappointed. The empirical problem to be solved will be the selection of an 
indicator of loss of trust. 
The standard units of efficiency of a stock of social capital ksi result from 
correcting past investments in social capital by the loss of efficiency derived 
from the events that have affected trust negatively over time. To calculate 
the social capital at a moment of time t measured in units that take into 
account the effect of the loss of efficiency, we consider that d is the rate of 
depreciation of social capital, and δ=(1−d)  the survival rate. 
b. The flow of services provided by a certain stock, once corrected for loss of 
efficiency, depends on the intensity of use or degree of utilization of the 
capacity installed. In general, when measuring the services of physical or 
human capital we consider the degree of utilization of the capacity to be 
constant. With social capital, this simplifying hypothesis should not be used, 
since this would eliminate what may be one of the key aspects in measuring 
the effects of social capital: the amplitude of the relationships of mutual trust 
of any member of a social network. The extension of relationships of trust to 
individuals with whom there is no direct relationship is known as 
                                                 
7 For a detailed description of the methodology for estimating physical capital, see Schreyer and Dupont 
(2005), together with the OECD Manual (OECD, 2001). 
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generalized trust 8 in the literature. The more generalized the trust, the more 
productive the social capital, since the network of connections will be wider 
and the opportunities to reduce transaction costs will reach a greater 
proportion of the economic relationships. 
In the context of repeated games models, a player’s social capital can be defined 
as his reputation for behaving cooperatively, or not, within a social network. A good 
reputation is an asset for the player as it makes him more likely to receive cooperative 
conduct from the agents he relates to (the favorable treatment to which the Michigan 
SCIG refers). However, as pointed out in Annen (2003), the value of a player’s social 
capital depends on the density of the network of relationships of trust between him and 
the rest of the members of the social network, i.e. on his degree of relation with the 
social network to which he belongs. 
The density of relationships of trust depends on three characteristics of social 
networks: a) their inclusiveness in the relationship of trust towards a greater or lesser 
number of members in the social network; b) the complexity of the social relationship 
network: when one of the properties of a social network is to simplify the complexity of 
its relationships, both the extent of cooperation and the value of the social capital are 
greater; and c) the capacity for communication existing within the network. Cooperation 
is more likely in social networks where the communication capacity is high. 
Consequently, to measure the amplitude with which social capital is used, it is important 
to value the degree of connection between each individual and the rest of the social 
network. To do this, elements considered in the studies of social networks and how they 
function9 must be introduced into the methodology. 
We consider individuals to be the nodes of the network of economic 
relationships, and let the connections of direct trust among them be the links, vectors or 
oriented edges that connect them. In formal terms, the network of direct connections of 
a population of dimension N can be represented as a deterministic graph, in the sense 
that from node i to node j either there is an oriented edge of trust (ci,j=1), or there is not 
(ci,j= 0). The elements ci,j (with value zero or one) form a matrix C of dimension (N×N), 
called adjacency matrix. The value zero is assigned to the elements cn,n of the principal 
diagonal because the direct connection of an individual with himself is considered 
irrelevant. The oriented edges between individuals are assumed to be deterministic (they 
                                                 
8 On the concept of generalized trust see Kramer, Brewer and Hanna (1996), Kramer (1999) and Stolle 
(1998). 
9 See, for example, Marsden and Lin (1982), Wellman and Berkovitz (1988) and Wasserman and Faust 
(1992) and Hanneman (2000), Vega-Redondo (2002 and 2003) and Annen (2003). 
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may take the values zero or one), though the results could be extended to the case where 
the adjacency matrix is probabilistic. 
Trust spreads through direct and indirect links. A direct connection (also called a 
connection of order 1) between two individuals is an oriented edge. An indirect 
connection (i.e., a connection of order p, for p=2, 3, 4,...) is a path from one individual 
to another (or itself) through a number p of oriented edges. To count indirect 
connections we can consider successive powers of C: given an integer p, Cp has entries 
c(p)i,j , being c(p)i,j the number of p-th order connections from element i to element j. 
Connections of p-order are non-existent if  c(p)i,j = 0. 
Given that a higher order connection is somehow less relevant, we assume that 
its capacity to transmit trust will be lower the higher the order. To take this into account, 
we propose the construction of the following (N×N)-matrix: 
 ( ) ,
1
( )
2 ( 1)
p
i j p p
p
CC c
N
∞∞ ∞
=
= = −∑ . (4) 
The elements of C∞ are obtained by adding together all the connections of orders 
1,2,3,... leaving an individual i. To do this we add elementwise the corresponding Cp’s, 
duly weighted, so that the series that generates each element of C∞ will be convergent10. 
The degree of connection ci of individual i with the rest of the individuals in the 
network is defined as follows: 
 ( ) ( ), ,
1 1
1
2
N N
i i k k i
k k
c c c∞ ∞
= =
⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ . (5) 
We can observe that an individual’s degree of connection depends not only on 
the oriented paths departing from him (the first sum, formed by the elements of row i of 
the matrix), but also on those ending at him (the second sum, formed by the elements of 
column i of the matrix. In this way we capture the idea of reciprocity that is highlighted 
by social capital. It should also be emphasized that not only do we compute an 
individual’s direct and indirect relations with others, or of others with him, but also the 
relations of the other individuals with each other. Consequently, an individual’s degree 
of relation also improves (worsens) if the degree of relation of the other individuals with 
each other improves (worsens). This characteristic of the proposed measure of the 
                                                 
10 See the demonstration of the convergence of the series in Appendix 1. 
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degree of connection allows us to capture adequately the effect of the network of 
relationships of trust. 
It follows that the degree of connection of any individual is a number in the 
interval [0,1].  If an individual j is isolated, i.e. if he trusts nobody and nobody trusts 
him, it will be true that cj,i = 0 and ci,j = 0, for every i. In this case, cj = 0. On the other 
hand, if he is directly connected with all the others it will be true that cj,i = 1 and ci,j = 1, 
for each pair (i ≠ j) and cj = 1. If all the individuals are in this latter situation we say that 
the social network is completely connected and the maximum degree of generalization 
of trust has been reached. In this case, the matrix associated with the indicators of the 
degree of connection ci will have values equal to one in all its elements, except in those 
of the principal diagonal, which will have zero value by construction11. 
2.3. The flow of social capital productive services 
As mentioned above, the capacity of a unit of capital to contribute to the 
production of output depends on the flow capital services (fks) deriving from it. In this 
case, fks results from the utilization of social capital in a social network, and is given by 
the accumulated capital measured in units of efficiency ksi and the individual’s degree 
of connection, ci: 
 i i ifks c ks= . (6) 
If the individual is completely related (ci=1), the social capital makes the 
maximum contribution possible and the flow of services can be proxied by the stock12. 
If the individual is completely isolated (ci=0) the contribution of his social capital will 
be nil, as occurs in the case of unused capital goods. 
The economic value of the flow of social capital services is obtained, as in the 
case of physical capitals, by considering that the user cost of capital is an adequate 
reflection of its productivity (Jorgenson, 1963). The user cost is the price to be paid for 
the services of a capital asset and should cover, in equilibrium, the costs borne by the 
owner of that asset: the depreciation d and the financial opportunity cost ρ in real terms. 
Since we are expressing all magnitudes in real terms, we define the user cost ui of a unit 
of social capital 13 as the sum of its two components: 
                                                 
11 For the formal justification of the above affirmations see Appendix 1. 
12 As we have mentioned, this is habitual in measures of physical capital that do not consider the problem 
of the utilization of installed capacity. See Schreyer and Dupont (2005). 
13 It is reasonable to assume that social capital has a financial opportunity cost because it had an 
investment cost that was evaluated in order to make it comparable with other labor or capital costs.  
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 ui= ρi + di  (7) 
and therefore the value of the capital services, vksi, will be 
 ( )i i i i i i ivks u fks d c ksρ= = + . (8) 
2.4. The aggregation of individuals’ social capital 
The next step in calculating the index of social capital services of an economy is 
to aggregate the social capital services of the individuals participating in the social 
network. For this purpose we proceed, once again, in the same way as when we 
aggregate the services of different assets in the case of physical capital, using as weights 
in the aggregation the prices of the services, i.e. the corresponding user cost of capital 
(OECD, 2001). 
Nevertheless, we must distinguish between the aggregation of individual capitals 
or their services, and the aggregation of the value of the capital services. When we 
aggregate values of the capital services, expressed in units of the same period, they can 
be added together without any problem: 
 ( )
1 1
N N
i i i i i
i i
VKS vks d c ksρ
= =
= = +∑ ∑ . (9) 
On the other hand, if we are aggregating the capitals or their services, as occurs 
in the case of different assets of physical capital, we have to bear in mind that these 
variables are heterogeneous and cannot be added together directly. The weight vi of the 
user cost of i in the aggregated user cost is established by the values of capital services: 
 
1
i
i N
j
j
vksv
vks
=
=
∑
. (10) 
The aggregation of the various individual capital services into the aggregated 
social capital services KS is done by means of a multiplicative Tornqvist index, which 
uses the weightings we have just defined as exponents. Furthermore, in the aggregation 
of individual social capital we take into account that the benefits (services) of social 
capital reach more or fewer individuals depending on the size of the network of trust, 
measured by the number of its nodes that are connected (N): 
 
1
i
N
v
i
i
KS N fks
=
= ∏ . (11) 
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Substituting (6) in the above expression, we obtain  
 
1
i i
N
v v
i i
i
KS N c ks
=
= ∏  (12) 
indicating that the aggregated social capital services depend on four variables: the 
accumulated individual stocks of social capital measured in units of efficiency, the 
amplitude of the network, the degree of connection of the individuals and the weight of 
the user cost. 
A particular case, of special interest to the empirical application of this 
methodology at aggregated level, is that which considers a representative agent of a 
society in which all individuals are equal in their endowments of social capital, in their 
user cost and in their degree of connection. In this case vi = 1/N, ksi=ks, ci=c, and we 
immediately verify that: 
 KS = N fksi = N c ks. (13) 
The aggregated social capital services KS intervene in the production function 
and their quantity is a measure of the volume of productive social capital or, if 
preferred, a measure of the volume of productive social capital services in the 
terminology of the methodology for measuring physical capital (OECD, 2001). The 
larger the size of the social network (N) and the more connected it is, the greater c, (i.e. 
the greater the generalization of the networks of trust), the greater the contribution of 
social capital, ks, to production will be. 
2.5. The optimal investment in social capital 
Given all the above, the condition to be maximized by the individual investor in 
social capital shown in (2) can be rewritten taking into consideration the per-worker 
product function. The production function is assumed to be a Cobb-Douglas, in which 
the physical capital (K), human capital (H), labor (L) and aggregated social capital (KS) 
factors are combined to obtain the level of income. If the aggregated social capital is 
expressed as a function of the individual social capital using equation (12), the per-
worker production function can be expressed as follows: 
 1
j j
N
v v
j jt
jt
t t t t t t t t
t t
c ks
KSy A k h A k h N
L L
β
β
α φ α φ β
β β
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= =
∏
 (14) 
where the variables per worker are reflected in lower-case letters. 
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Thus, an individual i faces the problem of maximization defined by equations 
(2), (3) and (14). The first order conditions for each period t are as follows14: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
11
0 1 1
1 ' 1
1 1
lT t N
ij
t it it l jt t l
l j jt l
w C Is G y v
ks
λδβρ ρ
− −
+ ++ +
= = + +
⎡ ⎤= − ⎢ ⎥+ + ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑  (15) 
where jtij
it
Is
Is
λ ∂= ∂  is the conjectural variation measuring individual i’s expectation of the 
change that will occur in the decision of another individual j to invest in social capital, 
in response to changes in i’s own investment in social capital.  
According to this condition, investment in ks takes place up to the point where 
the marginal cost attributed in the period to the effort to cooperate (reflected on the left-
hand side of the expression) equals, at present values, the marginal income expected 
with the passage of time (on the right hand side). 
The marginal cost of cooperating depends on the equivalent, in working time, to 
the effort required by cooperation and the opportunity cost of that same time, proxied by 
wages, w . The effort required by cooperation is subjective and depends on individuals’ 
attitudes, predominating values and their degree of assimilation, the functioning of 
institutions, the system of social sanctions, etc. For an altruist, the cost of that effort 
would be zero, so he would trust (invest in social capital) without any cost constraint. 
On the right hand side of the expression, the marginal income of the investment 
in social capital depends on the following: the well-being associated with the average 
income expected by workers (y) corrected for inequality (1-G); on the contribution of 
social capital to income (β); on the survival rate of the stock of social capital (δ); on the 
temporal horizon of the flow of net income from social capital (T-t); on the rate of 
discount to be applied to future income (ρ) and, finally, on the average of the quotient 
between the conjectural variation of individual j with respect to his social capital 
(λij/ksjt) weighted by each individual’s participation in the user cost (vj). 
Depending on how it is assumed other individuals will react to the decision-
maker’s investment in social capital, the first order condition can take a different form. 
                                                 
14 See Appendix 2. 
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Of the variety of solutions that may arise from equation (15) as a function of the values 
of λ, two particular cases stand out15. 
i) λij=0 ∀  j ≠ i. In this case, agent i’s decisions on the magnitude of his 
investment in social capital do not alter the optimal investments of the other agents and 
the first order solution can be written as follows: 
 ( ) ( )
1
1
' 1
1
T t
t
t it i
it
yw C Is v G
ks
δ
ρβ ρ δ
−⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠= − + −  (16) 
in which the marginal income of social capital depends, as well as on the factors 
commented above, on the weight of the user cost of individual i’s social capital in the 
user cost of total social capital. 
ii) If we assume the case of the representative agent of a society in which all 
individuals are equal in their endowments of social capital (ksj=ks ∀  j), in the costs of 
use that they face (vj=1/N  ∀  j) and in the response to the variations in social capital of 
any individual of the sample (λij=λ  ∀  j ≠ i), the condition defined by equation (15) can 
be written as follows: 
 ( ) ( )
1
11 ( 1)' 1
1
T t
t
t it
it
N yw C Is G
N ks
δ
ρλβ ρ δ
−⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟++ −⎛ ⎞ ⎝ ⎠= −⎜ ⎟ + −⎝ ⎠ . (17) 
 Now the optimal social capital also depends on the population and on the 
conjectural variation λ. We can establish an additional assumption whereby when one 
individual decides to invest in social capital he conjectures that the rest are going to act 
reciprocally towards him, making a similar investment (λ=1). In this hypothesis, the 
first order condition of the individual social capital does not depend on participation in 
the user cost of social capital. The condition of equilibrium in this case is represented by 
equation (18). 
 ( ) ( )
1
1
' 1
1
T t
t
t it
it
yw C Is G
ks
δ
ρβ ρ δ
−⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠= − + − . (18) 
                                                 
15 In order to reach the following results it is assumed that individuals’ expectations of the future 
evolution of y, k and ks respond to past trends and to the conditions of continuous growth in equilibrium 
(constancy of the capital / product ratio). See Appendix 2. 
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2.6. The determinants of the optimal stock of social capital 
To analyze the determinants of the optimal stock of individual capital we will 
focus on the case of the representative individual –case ii) in the previous section. The 
stock of capital is derived from expression (17) by solving ks, volume of social capital, 
which will be given by the following expression.  
 ( ) ( )
*
1
11 ( 1) 1
1'
T t
t
it
t it
N yks G
N w C Is
δ
ρλβ ρ δ
−⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟++ −⎛ ⎞ ⎝ ⎠= −⎜ ⎟ + −⎝ ⎠  (19) 
For the particular case of the representative agent, once ks have been calculated, 
the volume of the aggregated social capital services KS is  
 * *t t tKS N cks= . (20) 
Therefore, the equilibrium level of individual social capital depends on a set of 
economic and social circumstances represented by the following variables, which affect, 
caeteris paribus, the optimum of ks, as follows: 
a.  Social capital increases with the income per capita (and the productivity per 
worker), because the expected future payments of cooperation are greater. 
b. Social capital decreases with an increase in inequality, because the risk of 
being excluded from the payments made by that society reduces incentives 
to trust. 
c. Social capital decreases with the increase of the average age of the 
population, because the number of years during which positive payments can 
be obtained is reduced. 
d. The investment in social capital increases with the number of years during 
which an individual expects to participate in the social network, because the 
horizon for obtaining net payments is widened. For individuals who do not 
intend to emigrate, T can be considered equal to life expectancy. 
e. The investment in social capital decreases with the increase in the reserve 
wage, because the part of the remuneration considered favorable treatment is 
reduced and the subjective cost of investing in ks increases. 
f. The investment in social capital increases with the reduction of the marginal 
cost of cooperation, because less effort is required to cooperate. 
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g. Increases in the contribution of social capital to the income generated (β) 
have positive effects on the social capital of the individual. 
h. The effects of variations in the temporal rate of discount and in the rate of 
depreciation do not have a definite sign. 
i. Social capital increases with the increase in the expected reciprocity of 
agents to the decisions by the rest of the individuals around them to invest in 
social capital (λ). 
Aggregated productive social capital, KS*, is also a function of the above 
variables and, additionally, depends positively on the dimension of the network, N, and 
its degree of connection, c. 
 
3. The estimation of social capital: the empirical model 
The model of investment and accumulation of social capital in the above section, 
specified for the case of the representative agent, provides a method for estimating its 
value on the basis of the variables intervening in expressions (19) and (20). However, 
applying this methodology to the calculation of social capital also requires a system of 
information suitable for estimating the values of each of the variables.  
In general, the information necessary to calculate the stock of the various types 
of capital in economies is not available in its entirety, because the part of national 
accounts systems that refers to production and income, and their components, is much 
more advanced than the accounts referring to property, assets and wealth. In fact, not all 
the information needed to calculate physical capital is available in most countries, nor in 
the case of human capital do data banks exist with reliable estimations. 
In social capital, information limitations are even greater, and for this reason the 
empirical application of the methodology developed in the previous section only 
represents an initial approximation. Nevertheless, some of the determinants of social 
capital are regularly estimated by economic statistics. Thus, it is possible for many 
economies to use standardized proxies of the variables Y, L, y,  r, w, T, t, G by resorting 
to the figures of the National Accounts, labor, demographic or financial statistics, 
household surveys and so on. Other determinants of social capital are variables for 
which the information is not available and there is not even any agreement as to how 
they should be defined and measured. Such is the case for the degree of connection of 
the social network, c; the marginal cost of investing in social capital C’(Is); the rate of 
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survival δ; the reserve wage _w ; the contribution of social capital to income β; and the 
response of agents to an individual’s investments in social capital (λ). Consequently, to 
estimate social capital, proxies of these variables will have to be related, based on 
hypotheses that ensure the consistency of their values with certain economic 
relationships. 
3.1. Selected proxies 
Given the macroeconomic perspective of this paper, the proxies chosen for the 
five problematical variables are as follows:  
The marginal cost of investing in ks, C´(Is) 
The cost individuals attribute to investment in social capital is considered to 
depend on the scales of values, the individuals’ preferences and the average distance 
between individuals in each society. In this study we choose to proxy this variable by 
estimating it using an indicator of human capital, for the reasons given by Coleman 
(1988) when he underlines the role of the closure in the effectiveness of social norms 
and the relationship between social capital and human capital. This is also the proposal 
to come out of recent studies into the relationships between human capital and social 
capital (Gradstein and Justman, 2000; Temple, 2001; Annen, 2003). Our empirical 
approach considers a measure of the cost of investing in social capital derived from the 
percentage of individuals with at least secondary education, on the understanding that 
this level of education (currently compulsory in many developed countries) ensures the 
transmission of a set of basic common values and knowledge. This percentage, in this 
interpretation, constitutes a basic indicator of a society’s cultural homogeneity. The 
indicator of the marginal cost of the investment in social capital will be 100 minus this 
percentage. 
Another alternative approach to the cost of trust is to consider that it decreases 
for individuals accustomed to participating in horizontal networks, such as voluntary 
associations. In this case we can use as a proxy of the cost of social capital the variable 
which, according to Putnam’s approach, is in itself a measure of social capital 
Nevertheless, the limitations on the availability of information on this variable for the 
set of countries analyzed and its heterogeneity lead us to use the first indicator. 
The rate of depreciation d and the rate of survival δ of social capital. 
In social capital, the rate of depreciation depends on the frequency with which 
the expectations of favorable treatment are disappointed. The most important cause of 
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this for most of the population is losing one’s job, because it excludes the individual 
from the main source of access to income and from one of the basic circuits of social 
relations: work. We consider that the rate of unemployment proxies the rate of 
depreciation of social capital. The rate of survival of social capital depends on the rate 
of accumulated depreciation. 
The degree of connection of the social network c 
Unlike other approaches to social capital, the degree of connection is here just 
one determinant of social capital and not the only one. Since for the moment there are 
no data offering measures of the degree of connection that respond to the concept used 
in the theoretical model, we explore proxies in two directions: 
Firstly, we can use the measures of the degree of generalized trust (trust) 
corresponding to the surveys by the WVS or GSS as a proxy of c. This is limited by the 
fact that annual series are not available in most of the countries in these surveys. 
Alternatively, it is feasible to proxy this variable by means of indicators of the degree of 
trust prevailing in financial or commercial relationships. In fact, trust games and 
experimental studies of trust often consider situations similar to those that occur in 
financial systems, in which an individual deposits funds and trusts their investment to 
the banks, or in which other individuals receive credits (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 
1995). If we consider the amplitude of the credit the economy grants in relation to the 
volume of transactions within it, we may have a reasonable proxy of what proportion of 
economic agents are connected by relationships of trust. Annual information on this 
indicator does exist in many countries, though the data also pose some problems of 
homogeneity16. 
The reserve wage w  
National Accounts statistics include information about the compensation of 
employees. However, this is not the variable that interests us here. Compensation of 
employees includes remuneration for labor in the strictest sense, for human capital and 
remuneration for social capital. The objective is therefore to analyze which part of the 
wage received is considered to be the cost of compensation for labor and which part 
remuneration of social capital. These variables, w  and β, can be proxied as structural 
data of the economic system and obtained from the estimation of a production function. 
                                                 
16 The volume of credit as an indicator of the extension of trust networks may be biased downwards in 
financial systems strongly oriented to the financial markets, in which credit has less weight.  In any case, 
if this is a structural feature it will not have too much influence on the evolution of the indicator. 
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Let’s suppose that the production function takes the form: 
 Y AK H KS Lα φ β γ= . (21) 
If we assume, as is habitual, that the remunerations of the factors coincide with 
their marginal productivities, the following relation will be true: 
 ( ) Yw
L
γ φ= +  (22) 
from which the reserve wage w  can be obtained on the basis of the usual income and 
employment statistics and the estimated value of γ and φ. In turn, parameter β is also 
obtained from the estimation of equation (21). 
If β, γ and φ are constant they will not affect the variability of ks, and we could 
use an index of ks in the estimation of differences in the production function without 
knowing the value of these two variables. Using expression (22), equation (19) can be 
rewritten as follows: 
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. (23) 
in which, giving β , γ and φ   arbitrary values (e.g. β=1, γ=1, φ=1), it is possible to 
calculate the index of ks. 
Having estimated equation (21) under these conditions, we know the value of β / 
(γ+φ), and on this basis can calculate the reserve wage, w , and through (23), the level of 
ks and, therefore, of the aggregate KS. 
Conjectural variation of the investment in social capital (λ) 
 As well as focussing on the case of the representative agent, we adopt the 
simplifying assumption that the individuals in a society act reciprocally to the 
investment decisions of any one of them, i.e. λ=1.  
3.2. Estimation for a sample of countries 
To illustrate the application of the proposed method, we estimated the social 
capital in a broad set of OECD economies. These are economies with powerful 
databases and with a variety of levels of development and trajectories, thus enabling us 
to appreciate different profiles of how social capital has evolved. The period studied 
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covers the years from 1970 to 2001. Table 1 and Appendix 3 show the statistical 
sources used to obtain the proxies necessary for the determination of KS in accordance 
with expressions (20) and (23). When analyzing the results of these estimations, the 
necessary precautions to deal with problems of comparability of statistical sources must 
be borne in mind. To obtain the information shown in Table 1 we sought the highest 
degree of homogeneity in the data source, so that comparisons between countries would 
be as robust as possible, although this objective is not always completely guaranteed by 
international databases. 
TABLE 1: Variables and data sources in the estimation of social capital 
 
 Proxy used OECD sample (1970-2001) 
C Degree of connection of the network1 Loans / GDP 
Monetary Survey (International Financial 
Statistics, IMF) y OECD 
C'(Is) 
Marginal cost of 
investment in social 
capital 
% of working–age 
population with at least 
secondary education 
Barro-Lee (2002) database: International 
Measures of Schooling Years and Schooling 
Quality 
G Income inequality index Gini Index World Income Inequality Database (ONU) and own elaboration 
d Social capital depreciation rate Unemployment rate 
Labour Force Statistics (OECD) and Economic 
Outlook (OECD) 
ρ Discount factor Constant discount rate 4% 
T-t 
Life expectancy at the 
average age of the 
population 
OECD Health Data, Eurostat and official statistical offices. 
Life expectancy of the population of 40 years, corrected by the average age of 
the population. 
N Employment  Labour Force Statistics (OECD) and Economic Outlook (OECD) 
Y GDP GDP National Accounts (OECD) 
w Compensation of employees 
Compensation of employees 
/ Employment National Accounts (OECD) 
K Stock of physical capital Non-residential physical capital stock 
ISDB (OECD), STAN (OECD) and  Economic 
Outlook (OECD) databases 
Gross Capital Stock 
1 The variable c in the theoretical model is limited between 0 and 1, so the Credits / GDP ratios have been re-scaled 
by the maximum value for the countries of the OECD in the sample period. 
 
 As we have pointed out, the estimation of the social capital series depends on the 
product elasticities of social capital, β, and on the contributions of labor, γ, and of 
human capital, φ. If we assume that these unknown parameters are constant, as is usual 
in the literature on economic growth, we can use econometric techniques to estimate 
them. 
By expressing all the variables in equation (21) in per-worker terms, taking 
logarithms and first differences and assuming a constant rate of technical progress, we 
obtain: 
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 t t t t tdy dk dks dl dhα β γ φ= + + + . (24) 
Given that the rate of growth of social capital (dks) does not depend on the 
values of the parameters of the production function as they are assumed to be constant, 
they can be estimated by econometric techniques on the basis of the information 
available. Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of the production function. The 
econometric specification adopted includes per capita income as a dependent variable 
and four productive factors –physical capital, labor, human capital and social capital – 
as independent variables. Constant returns to scale are imposed and the estimations are 
performed using the random effects model17 of panel data techniques. The sample used 
for the estimation consists of all the countries for which physical capital data are 
available, i.e. the fifteen largest countries of the OECD. The parameters accompanying 
social capital, labor and human capital in this estimation are applied to the calculation of 
the social capital of the different economies considered. Additional estimations were 
performed for alternative specifications and the results showed very similar values of 
the ratios β/(γ+φ) around 0.05. 
TABLE 2: Estimation of the production function 
 1970-2001 
0,0066  Constant 
(5,00) 
0,4267   Dk 
(10,31) 
0,0256   Dks 
(3,21) 
  Dl 0,4710 
0,0766   Dh 
(2,23) 
   
  Adjusted R2 0,23
  Hausman Test  
  P-value 
2,49 
0,48 
  Observations 464 
Note: Estimation in logarithmic first differences. Dependent variable: annual growth of real GDP. In parentheses:  t-
ratio. Random effects model is estimated. Constant return to scale are imposed 
                                                 
17 The values of the Hausman test do not permit rejection of the null hypothesis of absence of correlation 
between the individual effects and the random disturbance; the random effects model is therefore 
consistent. 
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4. Evolution of social capital in the OECD countries  
Many of the debates around the role of social capital take place from an 
international perspective. It is therefore of interest to have available estimations of 
social capital for a broad set of countries with substantial differences in their normative, 
cultural, and educational frameworks, in their levels of income or in the degree of 
unemployment. Appendix 4 presents the social capital series obtained with the 
methodology described in the two preceding sections for 23 OECD countries. 
The various panels in Figure 1 show the evolution of the index of aggregated 
volume of social capital calculated, taking 1970 as the base year for each country and 
indexing all the data of each country in relation to this base year. We find that in all the 
countries except Denmark there were a growth in the levels of social capital during the 
more than thirty years included in the analysis. Nevertheless, during the time span 
analyzed, periods of decrease in the volume of services from social capital appear in 
many economies.  
Figure 2 represents the ranking of the annual rates of variation in the countries 
included in the estimation. Among the countries with high rates of variation of social 
capital are Korea, Luxembourg, Canada, Ireland, Portugal, United States and 
Netherlands, while the lowest growths of social capital are observed in Italy, Belgium, 
Australia, Spain, France or New Zealand. Additionally, in Denmark social capital 
actually decreased over the period. 
Certain countries stand out for their high levels of social capital resulting from 
the acceleration of accumulation in the 1990s. Such is the case of Korea, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Canada and Ireland in recent years. Others, such as Belgium, Finland, 
Greece, Japan, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland are characterized by the tendency to 
stagnate, or even the reduction, of their capital of trust in the last decade.  
The literature on social capital has on occasions presented the United States as 
a country whose social capital is in decline, based on the most frequently used 
indicators of social capital (indices of associationism and responses to the GSS or WVS 
on trust in others). The evolution of our estimation (Figure 1, last panel) shows an 
increasing trend, although the index followed an irregular path, with an initial period of 
relative stagnation (from 1970 to 1984) and a second one of growth, showing significant 
acceleration in the early 1990s. Since social capital does not decrease significantly, 
except for short periods, we could say that the economic foundations of trust have not 
fallen during recent decades in that country. This is to be expected of an economy 
 FIGURE 1: Social capital in OECD countries. 1970=100.  
 
Source: Own elaboration from statistical data sources in Appendix 3 
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Source: Own elaboration from statistical data sources in Appendix 3. 
 
whose income is growing, in which notable educational improvements took place 
during this period (which should favor cooperation), whose rates of unemployment 
were moderate and in which participation in financial relationships is widening.  
This vision of the evolution of trust and social capital, based on the results of the 
estimation, is clearly different from one that would be derived from taking the responses 
to the question on trust in the GSS (or WVS) as an index of social capital. In the case of 
the USA, this variable has a long series, so it is possible to compare the two results. 
Figure 3 clearly shows the difference between the two indices and it is evident that the 
valuations affirming that trust is on the decrease –based on the evolution of the variable 
trust- are not endorsed by our indicator of social capital. We can also observe that, if we 
use the variable trust in the calculation of KS (as a proxy of the degree of social 
connection instead of the variable based on the credit granted), the increasing trend of 
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social capital is maintained and its growth in the final period is also confirmed, albeit 
with a somewhat more irregular profile. 
 
FIGURE 3: Social capital and trust in the US. Different hypothesis for c 
 Per capital volume index of social capital (1970=100) and Trust (%).  
Note: Social capital (2): c is proxied by Trust instead of the ratio loans / GDP.
          In the series of Trust and of social capital (2) years for which information is available are marked. The rest of the 
years data are interpolated.
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5. Social capital and economic growth 
The aspect of social capital to which economists have paid most attention in the 
literature is its importance for economic growth. The complexity of present-day 
economies leads us to think that without an element that reduces transaction and 
supervision costs and limits the problems of asymmetrical information, it would be 
difficult for economies to progress. Consequently, it makes sense to explore whether the 
social capital estimated is able to explain part of the evolution of output and 
productivity. Some studies in the literature test the importance of social capital in 
explaining economic growth, although generally they do not use direct measures of 
social capital, but rather other types of institutional or social indicators. Thus, for 
example, Temple and Johnson (1998) use an indicator of “social capability” constructed 
from 25 economic and social characteristics from a sample of 74 developing countries. 
Knack and Keefer (1997) find that trust and civic cooperation are associated with 
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stronger economic performance, whereas such a relationship is not found when using 
associational activity. Hall and Jones (1999) find a close association between output per 
worker and what they call “measures of social infrastructure”. Zak and Knack (2001) 
also find a positive relation between trust and economic growth. 
 On the basis of the methodology developed to measure social capital, and its 
estimation, in this section we test the capacity of the proposed measure to explain 
economic growth. To do this we take an important reference in the literature as our 
starting point: the Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) model of growth. Since information 
on the stock of social capital is available for a broad set of countries for the period 
between 1970 and 2001, we use both the cross-section and the temporal dimensions of 
the data. Our analysis will therefore be similar to that of Islam (1995). 
We consider an economy in which four inputs exist: labor (L) and three kinds of 
capital, physical (K), human (H) and social (KS). We assume that the production 
function is a Cobb-Douglas, so that production at a moment in time t can be written as 
follows: 
 1( )t t t t t tY K H KS A Lα φ β α β φ− − −=  (25) 
where A is the level of technology. L and A are assumed to grow exogenously at 
constant rates n and g: 
 0 nttL L e= ; 0 gttA A e= . (26) 
The model assumes that the rates of saving dedicated to investment in physical, human 
or social capital are constant. Let sk, sh and sks be the rates of saving corresponding to 
physical, human or social capital respectively, and k, h, ks and y the stock of physical, 
human, social capital and the level of income per effective unit of labor (AL). As in 
Mankiw et al. (1992) we assume that the three accumulative factors depreciate at the 
same rate18 δ. Additionally, we assume that α+β+φ<1, meaning that there are 
diminishing returns on all types of capital. The steady state can be characterized by the 
following equations: 
 
1
1 1
* k h kss s sk
n g
β φ φ β α β φ
δ
− − − − −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
; 
1
1 1
* k h kss s sh
n g
α β α β α β φ
δ
− − − − −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
;
1
1 1
* k h kss s sks
n g
α φ α φ α β φ
δ
− − − − −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
. (27) 
                                                 
18 In developing the measure of social capital we have assumed the existence of a certain rate of 
depreciation that would not necessarily coincide with the rate of physical or human capital. For the sake 
of simplicity, we adopt the assumption of equality in the rates of depreciation of the three types of capital, 
though the development of the model would be similar even if different rates of depreciation were 
assumed. 
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On the basis of these equilibrium values of the factors of we can write the per 
capita income corresponding to the steady state as a function of the rate of saving (rate 
of investment) and the volume of human and social capital stock: 
 ( )0ln ln ln ln ln1 1 1 1t kt
Y A gt n g s h ks
L
α α φ βδα α α α
⎛ ⎞ = + − + + + + +⎜ ⎟ − − − −⎝ ⎠
. (28) 
Taking (28) into account we can write the equation describing behavior around 
the steady state. For this purpose, let *yˆ  be the level of income per worker in the steady 
state and ˆty  the current value of the income per worker. Approximating around the 
steady state, the pace of convergence is given by: 
 ( )*ˆln ˆln lnt td y y ydt ψ= −  (29) 
where ψ=(n+g+δ)(1-α-β-φ). Operating on the basis of this equation we arrive at the 
equation that constitutes the base for our empirical test:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
1 0 2 1
ln 1 ln ln 1 ln
1 1
ln ln 1 ln ( )
1
t k
t
y e s n g e h
ks e y e A g t e t
ψτ ψτ
ψτ ψτ ψτ
α φδα α
β
α
− −
= − − + + + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦− −
+ + + − + −−
 (30) 
where yt2 is the level of income per worker at a given time, yt1 the level of income at the 
start and τ=t2-t1 the time between t2 and t1. As shown by Islam (1995), this equation 
corresponds to the usual formulation of a dynamic panel, (1-e-Ψτ)lnA0 being the 
individual effects (in our case countries) and g(t2-e-Ψτt1) temporal effects. 
Since the aim of this section is to test the results of the determinants of economic 
growth when social capital is included as a productive factor, we take the study by 
Islam (1995) as reference. To ensure that the results are coherent with those obtained in 
his study we proceed as follows. First we construct the variables necessary for the 
estimation following Islam (1995) as closely as possible. Then we replicate the 
estimations obtained in the reference study for the same period (1960-1985) and for the 
period for which we have been able to construct the bank of data on social capital 
(1965-2000). Thirdly, we repeat the estimations including social capital in order to 
value its capacity to explain economic growth. 
The data panel is constructed, as in Islam (1995), by dividing the period of 
analysis into shorter intervals of five years. Periods of one year may be too short to 
allow an analysis of convergence. On the other hand, the longer the periods, the less 
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realistic may be the assumptions of constancy in the rates of population growth and of 
depreciation. The period 1965-2000, therefore, contains seven sub-periods: 1965-1970, 
1970-1975, 1975-1980, 1980-1985, 1985-1990, 1990-1995 and 1995-2000. The 
estimations are performed for 21 OECD countries, coinciding with Islam’s (1995) third 
sub-sample19.  
The dependent variable, per capita GDP in real terms, and the rate of variation of 
population (n) between the two periods analyzed were obtained from Heston, Summers 
and Aten (2002). As in Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam (1995) we use a constant value 
of 0.05 as proxy of (g+δ). The stock of human capital, h, is proxied by the average 
years of education of the population aged over 15 taken from the Barro and Lee (2000) 
data base. The rate of investment was also obtained from Heston et al. (2002) and 
corresponds to the investment share of GDP in constant terms.  
To test whether the different statistical sources, definitions of variables and 
periods of analysis generate differences in the estimations results from those of Islam 
(1995), columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 give the results of the estimation of equation (30) 
using Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) for the same period examined by Islam 
(1960-1985). The specifications do not include social capital because it was not possible 
to construct the variable for years prior to 1970. If the results are compared with the 
third column (OECD sample), restricted estimation, obtained by Islam (1995) in his 
table 4, we can verify that they are similar. The explanatory capacity of both models is 
high, in both cases over 0.96. On the other hand, we obtain an estimate of the elasticity 
of output with respect to capital of 0.35, whereas Islam (1995) reports a relatively lower 
level of 0.20. Similar results are obtained when human capital is included in the 
estimation. Islam’s rate of convergence is 0.09, our estimation is 0.08, while the values 
of output elasticity relative to physical capital are respectively 0.35 and 0.20. In both 
cases, human capital presents a negative contribution to output (-0.04 in the case of 
Islam, 1995; and -0.09 in ours). The similarity between the results of the estimations 
with and without human capital is a phenomenon already highlighted by Islam (1995) 
                                                 
19 We include all the countries in Islam (1965) except Turkey, for which we were unable to estimate the 
stock of social capital. Also, in the span 1965-1970 Germany is not considered because the population 
data for 1965 are not available. Specifically, the countries analyzed are the fourteen members of the 
European Union (except Luxembourg), Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and 
the United States. 
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and derives from the non-significance of the coefficient of human capital in the 
regression. This result, also obtained in other studies, is generally attributed to the 
discrepancy between the theoretical variable H and the proxies used in the regressions20. 
The results obtained are therefore comparable to those of the reference article for the 
common period, though the rates of convergence are slightly lower, and the output 
elasticity slightly higher. 
TABLE 3: Estimation of the Makiw, Romer and Weil (1992)-Islam (1995) model 
including social capital 
Sample of 21 OECD countries 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 See Islam (1995), De la Fuente and Doménech (2001), Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001), Cohen and 
Soto (2001), Krueger and Lindahl (2001) and De la Fuente and Doménech (2002). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln y t-1 0.6670 0.3730 0.7686 0.7736 0.6923 0.5341 0.6042 0.5094
(13.20) (13.03) (10.94) (10.05) (9.01) (1.65) (2.07) (2.42)
ln ki - ln (n+g+δ) 0.1767 0.1751 0.1811 0.1816 0.1740 0.2322 0.2514 0.2243
(4.22) (4.16) (5.00) (4.97) (5.01) (6.33) (8.48) (5.86)
ln H -0.0470 -0.0125 -0.0252 -0.1237 -0.0994
(-0.61) (-0.16) (-0.34) (-1.47) (-0.93)
ln KS 0.0526 0.0587
(3.42) (3.78)
Implicit λ 0.0810 0.0792 0.0526 0.0513 0.0736 0.1254 0.1008 0.1349
(5.35) (5.16) (2.88) (2.58) (3.32) (0.30) (1.04) (1.63)
Implicit α 0.3467 0.3488 0.4391 0.4451 0.3612 0.3326 0.3885 0.3137
(4.83) (4.77) (4.99) (4.56) (4.85) (1.91) (2.05) (2.55)
Implicit φ -0.0935 -0.0305 -0.0524 -0.1911 -0.1390
(-0.60) (-0.16) (-0.34) (-1.02) (-0.84)
Implicit β 0.1092 0.0821
(3.34) (2.75)
R2 0.9865 0.9866 0.9752 0.9752 0.9779 0.3741 0.3495 0.4614
s.e. regresión 0.0436 0.0437 0.0495 0.0497 0.0471 0.0579 0.0590 0.0542
Statistics (p-values)
Sargan Test (0.14) (0.24) (0.49)
AR(1) test (0.29) (0.23) (0.34)
AR(2) test (0.65) (0.54) (0.50)
AR(3) test (0.73) (0.66) (0.83)
LSDV: Least Squares Dummy Variable
Equation Estimated:
Note: in brackets t-statistics. The data of each period are divided in 5-years time spans. The panel is fomed by the same 21 countries as the OECD sample in Isalm 
[1995]  except Turkey. In the subperiod 1965-1970 Germany is also excluded. Time effects are included.
The GMM models (equations 6 to 8) have been estimated in first differences. The instruments used are the endogenous variable in levels with two, three and four 
lags
LSDV
1960-1985 1965-2000
GMMLSDV
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )ln 1 ln 1 ln 1 ln
1 1 1t t k
y e y e s n g e h e ksλτ λτ λτ λττ
α φ βδα α α
− − − −
−= + − − + + + − + −− − −
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In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 the two previous estimations are repeated by 
means of LSDV for the period 1965-2000, for which information on social capital is 
available. In the estimation, the rate of convergence stands out as lower than that 
obtained previously, at 0.05. Also, whereas in the previous sub-period the elasticity of 
output relative to capital showed levels in accordance with the theoretical model (1/3), 
in the estimations for the period 1965-2000 they are somewhat higher, around 44%. 
Column (5) shows the effects of the inclusion of social capital in the estimations. 
Firstly, the rate of convergence increases, rising from 0.05 to 0.07. The elasticity of 
capital takes values that are more in accordance with the expected magnitude of one 
third (0.36) and human capital continues to present a negative contribution, although not 
significant. It should also be highlighted that the participation of social capital in the 
total income is 11%. 
According to the results of column (5) of Table 3 social capital has a positive 
and significant effect when determining the level of income per capita of economies 
belonging to the OECD. Therefore, the fact that in an economy there are greater 
networks of trust which reach a substantial part of society generates reductions in 
transaction and supervision costs in economic relationships. These in turn have a 
positive impact on the per capita income levels of the population, as shown by the social 
capital sign in the estimation. 
We chose the estimating technique, LSDV, from among those used in the 
reference study. But because the specification includes the lagged dependent variable, 
the estimations of the fixed effects model are inconsistent. To test the robustness of the 
results we present columns (6) to (8), in which the equations estimated for the period 
1965-2000 are replicated using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). To obtain 
consistent estimations, we estimate the model in first differences and use as instruments 
the endogenous variable in levels from the second retard up to, at most, the fourth 
(Doornik, Arellano and Bond, 2002). The estimation of specification (8), in which 
social capital is included, is done in two stages (Arellano and Bond, 1991), as first order 
autocorrelation in the residuals of the estimation is detected in stage one, and must 
therefore be corrected in the second stage. In the estimations of equations (6) and (7) no 
autocorrelation is detected, so the two-stage procedure is not required. 
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Starting from the statistics shown we can verify that there is no autocorrelation 
in the estimations and that the Sargan test does not permit rejection of the validity of the 
instruments used. Given that the estimation is done in first differences (and therefore 
without fixed effects) the coefficients of determination are lower than those of LSDV, 
but are still high. 
As to the results, in equations (6) and (7) we find that the paces of convergence 
are higher than the results obtained by LSDV and that the output elasticities of the 
factors of production are lower. Column (8) shows that social capital continues to have 
a positive and significant influence on the levels of per capita income in OECD 
economies. Its contribution to the generation of income is 0.08, slightly lower than that 
of the previous case. Human capital again presents a negative and non-significant sign 
and physical capital also presents an output elasticity of 0.31, somewhat lower than the 
above case. As a consequence of these lower output elasticities of the factors of 
production, the pace of convergence increases substantially compared to the estimation 
by LSDV, rising from 0.07 to 0.13. 
 
6. Conclusions 
A key characteristic of developed economies is the compatibility of rising levels 
both of (productive and technological) complexity and of efficiency, thanks to an 
effective conjunction of formal (legal norms, property rights) and informal rules. Both 
types operate through networks of social relationships and, in this sense, social capital 
plays an essential role in a well functioning economic system.  
Social capital is generated through cumulative processes of trust, which are fed 
by shared experiences of mutual cooperation in which expectations of favorable 
treatment are reinforced. According to the thesis put forward in this paper, these 
expectations may be based on the good results obtained by the members of each society 
in their participation in the economic relationships that occur within it. 
The study develops a theoretical model with the objective of obtaining a measure 
of social capital. The modeling is based, on the one hand, on analysis of the process of 
investment and accumulation in social capital in terms of its benefits and costs, as when 
considering any kind of physical or financial asset. The second key element in the 
methodology is the application to social capital of the conceptual framework and the 
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procedures commonly accepted for the measurement of physical capital. In this context, 
the proxies for social capital most commonly used (such as the measures of trust of the 
WVS and Putnam’s measures of associative density) would only be approximations to 
some of the relevant determinants of the volume of social capital, but not direct 
measures of it. 
The theoretical model that upholds the proposed measure identifies the following 
variables as determinants of the level of social capital: the improvement of income and 
well-being; the rate of depreciation of social capital if expectations of favorable 
treatment or of cooperation are disappointed; the cost of cooperation; and the amplitude 
and connection in the networks of trust. These determinants have been used to obtain a 
measure of social capital. The empirical application of this methodology had to deal 
with a lack of information on certain variables, which led to restrictive assumptions 
being made on occasions. 
The empirical approach to the measurement of social capital was carried out for 
most of the economies of the OECD countries over a long period, covering the years 
1965 to 2001. It should be borne in mind that the social capital was estimated in spite of 
the limitations of information, with the twin objectives of evaluating the possibilities of 
overcoming these limitations, and of testing the potential role of social capital in 
growth. 
The results indicate a general increase in the levels of social capital in the 
countries belonging to the OECD in the course of recent decades, but also indicate that 
the levels of trust go through periods of deterioration at different times in some 
countries. In the specific case of the United States, the hypothesis of the decline of its 
social capital, present in some of the literature, is not confirmed, although trust has been 
through periods of stagnation. On the other hand, we can appreciate a much more 
irregular evolution of social capital in other economies, such as Denmark, Switzerland, 
Belgium, United Kingdom or Spain, with periods of expansion and others of 
contraction. Using the extension of the Mankiw et al. (1992) model by Islam (1995), we 
have verified that social capital has the capacity to explain part of the economic growth 
in the OECD countries. The estimations performed enable us to value the output 
elasticity of social capital at around 7-10%. 
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Appendix 1. Definition of the degree of connection of the social network 
The measure of social connection proposed in section 2.2 is based on the 
definition of the degree of connection to a graph developed in this Appendix. Let a 
graph G be formed by N nodes or vertices and by a certain number of oriented edges or 
arrows. In the classical terminology, this is a determinist graph in the sense that between 
node i and node j either there is a connection, or there is not. In the first case cij= 1 
whereas in the second, cij = 0. The direct connection of an element with itself is 
considered irrelevant, so the value 0 is assigned to the element cii. We consider that 
there are N individuals, so the elements cij form an adjacency matrix C of dimension 
N×N. 
Given a natural number p, matrix Cp, the p-th power of matrix C, represents the 
state of the connections of order p. More precisely, denoting by cij(p) the element of 
matrix Cp in position (i,j), there are exactly cij(p) p-th order oriented connections from 
node i to node j. Connections of order p  are non-existent if cij(p)  = 0.  
We suppose that the importance of a connection from i towards j is less the 
higher its order, so a lower weight will be assigned to the connections of higher order. 
Starting from this consideration, we propose the construction of the following matrix: 
 ( ) ,
1
( )
2 ( 1)
p
i j p p
p
CC c
N
∞∞ ∞
=
= = −∑ . (A.1.1) 
Observe that C ∞  can also be obtained as follows: 
 
1 02 ( 1) 2 ( 1)
p p
p p p p
p p
C C Id
N N
∞ ∞
= =
= −− −∑ ∑   (A.1.2) 
where Id is the identity matrix of dimension N. Therefore,  
 
1
0 2 ( 1) 2( 1)
p
p p p
p
C CId
N N
−∞
=
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠∑  (A.1.3) 
and hence  
 
1
2( 1) p
CC Id Id
N
−
∞ ⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
. (A.1.4) 
It is important to justify the convergence of the series defining matrix C∞ as well 
as the existence of the inverse of Id - C/[2(N - 1)]. 
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Proposition 1. For the matrix C defined above associated with a graph G, the series in 
(A.I.1) is convergent. Matrix Id-C/[2(N-1)] is invertible.  
 Proof of proposition 1. We consider first C = CT, the matrix associated with a 
completely connected graph. In IRN we take the norm ||.|| ∞ , defined as ||x|| ∞  = sup{|xn| : 
n = 1, 2,...,N}. Therefore, CT: IRN   IRN obviously has norm N - 1 (in the 
corresponding ||.|| ∞ -norm for operators), then ||CT/[2(N - 1)] || ∞ = 1/2 if N > 2. 
Consequently, for an arbitrary matrix C we have ||C/[2(N - 1)]|| ∞ < 1/2 if N > 2. It is 
now obvious that the series defining C ∞  is convergent.  
The fact that, for N > 2, the matrix Id - C/[2(N - 1)] has inverse is a consequence 
of the fact that the linear application Id - C/[2(N - 1)] is an isomorphism, which can be 
deduced precisely from ||C/[2(N - 1)]|| ∞  < 1/2 if N > 2 (see, for example, Jameson, 
1974, Thm. 18.11).   QED 
Next we define the degree of connection ci of element i as follows:  
 ( ) ( )
1 1
1
2
N N
i ik ki
k k
c c c∞ ∞
= =
⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ . (A.1.5) 
Proposition 2. Properties of the degree of connection of the network: 
1. If G is a completely connected graph, the degree of connection ci of each 
element verifies ci = 1, i = 1, 2,...,N.  
2. The degree of connection of every element is a number in the interval [0, 1].  
3. An individual i is an isolated node if and only if ci = 0. 
 
 Proof of proposition 2 
1. Given p∈IN, it is simple to observe that if CTp = (ctij(p)), then  
 ( )
  
  
pp
ij
p
a si i j
ct
b si i j
=⎧⎪= ⎨ ≠⎪⎩
 (A.1.6) 
where i,j = 1, 2,...,N, ap and bp being two values obtained inductively as follows: 
if ap and bp are known for a value p ∈IN, then, for p + 1 the corresponding 
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values are ap+1 = bp(N - 1), bp+1 = (N- 2)bp + ap. As a1 = 0 and b1 = 1, we obtain 
the expression of CTp for any p ∈IN.  
Now let ( )
1
N
p
p ik
k
s ct
=
= ∑ (observe that the sum is independent of i). It is immediate, 
from the above description, that sp+1 = (N- 1)sp. Given that s1 = (N- 1), we obtain 
sp = (N- 1)p, p = 1, 2,.... Therefore, given the corresponding expression of CT ∞  
defined in (A.1.1), we have  
( )
1 1
1 1
2
N
ik p
k p
s ct
∞∞
∞
= =
= = =∑ ∑  which gives the result.  
2. Matrix C has all its entries positive or zero. The demonstration of this property 
of the degree of connections of the network is obtained directly from point 1 
above.  
3. The third affirmation is a consequence of the fact that, if in matrix C row i and 
column i are both zero, this is so in any power of C, and reciprocally.  QED 
Part 3 of the above result evidences the need to exclude as acceptable the edge of 
an element with itself. If these were counted the result would be that a graph formed by 
autistic nodes would have degree 1 of connection. 
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Appendix 2. Derivation of the condition of equilibrium 
Equations (2), (3) and (14) of the main text define the following maximization 
problem: 
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Assuming that N, ci and vi are constant, the maximization problem can be written 
for an individual i as follows: 
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The first order condition for a moment in time t is obtained by making the 
derivative of the objective function equal to zero with respect to the control variables 
Ist: 
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One of the elements of expression (A.2.5) is the derivative of the social capital 
of individual j at time t+l+1, with respect to the investment in social capital of the 
maximizing agent i: 
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Taking into account that the equation of accumulation of social capital at a 
moment t+l+1 can be written
1
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= + ∑ , we obtain that: 
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where the parameter λij measures the variation in the investment in social capital of 
agents j in response to variations in the investment decision of agent i.  
On the basis of (A.2.7), equation (A.2.6) can be rewritten: 
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Therefore, the first order condition of equation (A.2.5) is as follows: 
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Appendix 3. Statistical sources used 
The estimations for the sample of OECD countries were made for the period 
1970-2001. The approach to the variables that the theoretical model proposes as 
determinants of social capital, and the assumptions regarding them, are as follows: 
Degree of relation of the network, c (Bank loans / GDP). The data on the volume of 
credit by countries are taken from the International Monetary Fund’s International 
Financial Statistics database, specifically, from the Domestic Credit series (codes 
32..ZF and 32..ZW) contained in the Monetary Survey. Given that the volume of 
domestic credit in the database presents discontinuities for some countries, we have 
adjusted them by maintaining the original rates of variation. Also, as the theoretical 
model posits that the degree of connection in the network variable must be limited 
between zero and one, we re-scale the credit / GDP ratios of all the countries by the 
maximum ratio of the sample. 
Marginal cost of the investment in social capital, C’(Is). We use as proxy a measure 
of human capital, the percentage of the total population that has at least secondary 
education: Barro-Lee (International Measures of Schooling Years and Schooling 
Quality). The data available are five-yearly, so we have had to interpolate the years in 
which information was not available. For the United States we used information from 
the US Census Bureau. The Barro and Lee database does not include information on 
Luxembourg, so for this country we used the values from the Netherlands. Moreover, in 
the case of Germany, for the years prior to 1991 a series corresponding to the reunified 
Germany had to be constructed. 
Index of inequality of income distribution, G. The Gini indices of inequality of 
income distribution were obtained from the United Nations World Income Inequality 
Database, V 1.0. This base gathers together the results of several studies relating to the 
distribution of income. It therefore lacks a common methodology with regard to 
statistical sources, indicator of income used and the reference group for the calculation 
of the Gini indices. We obtain a series of the inequality index series on the basis of the 
predictions of a fixed effect regression model, in which the Gini indices have been made 
to depend on four variables: a trend, Government final consumption expenditure 
(National Accounts, OECD) as a percentage of GDP, per capita GDP and the rate of 
unemployment. 
GDP and Compensation of employees, w. The data are taken from the OECD 
National Accounts database, and are transformed from national currency to constant 
1995 PPP dollars. 
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Rate of depreciation of the stock of social capital, d, and number of employed, N. 
We use the rate of unemployment as proxy for the rate of depreciation of social capital. 
The rate of unemployment is taken from the Labor Force Statistics completed with 
Economic Outlook database (OECD) 
Life expectancy at the average age of the population, T-t. We used the OECD 
information on the life expectancy of the 40-year-old population published in OECD 
Health Data. Given that this information is shown separately for men and women, we 
calculated the weighted mean of the two. In order to take into account the differences in 
age structure among the different countries, we added the difference between forty and 
the average age taken from different sources to the life expectancy of the 40-year-olds 
in each country. 
Stock of physical capital. The data on the stock of physical capital are taken from 
OECD estimates collected in the ISDB database, and were completed with data from the 
two OECD databases STAN and Economic Outlook. 
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Appendix 4.  
 
Volume Index of Social Capital. 1970=100. 
 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Australia 100,0 92,3 86,1 94,8 88,9 73,3 72,6 66,0 60,4 62,9 63,9 64,8 56,3 42,9 50,7 64,5
Austria 100,0 105,7 111,7 114,9 112,4 114,4 127,7 136,3 138,0 147,5 156,9 151,3 141,1 134,0 148,3 155,3
Belgium 100,0 103,6 107,3 115,2 114,6 96,3 90,9 94,6 97,3 105,1 109,7 98,6 82,8 80,7 80,3 88,2
Canada 100,0 104,4 116,7 141,3 154,1 150,0 165,2 169,3 190,1 234,6 247,5 291,7 217,4 187,3 195,9 207,0
Denmark 100,0 92,9 93,8 92,6 64,9 63,4 53,6 46,1 40,6 53,0 53,0 41,2 39,7 43,0 61,7 73,5
Finland 100,0 100,1 95,2 94,8 107,4 115,5 96,7 80,1 68,0 80,9 100,3 104,3 111,0 122,6 134,9 156,5
France 100,0 102,1 108,8 111,3 114,4 106,2 109,3 111,3 113,9 109,9 108,4 101,2 99,1 99,4 91,9 90,6
Germany 100,0 103,1 105,2 106,0 91,1 75,4 80,3 88,8 100,1 118,5 131,5 123,8 107,9 99,7 115,1 123,9
Greece 100,0 114,5 122,0 120,0 139,0 154,4 167,2 195,0 198,9 198,5 184,8 188,2 162,6 138,7 136,6 149,6
Ireland 100,0 84,5 96,7 107,8 124,0 82,3 75,9 77,9 90,4 121,3 114,5 85,7 77,2 67,3 62,7 57,7
Italy 100,0 109,2 108,4 110,1 120,5 125,8 114,4 113,1 117,0 110,8 109,8 105,0 101,3 94,6 91,7 92,9
Japan 100,0 110,8 119,0 119,0 114,4 114,5 117,0 120,1 124,3 131,7 137,7 140,6 145,4 148,7 152,9 160,3
Luxembourg 100,0 110,8 113,2 105,7 100,0 130,1 129,6 148,5 284,7 305,4 340,1 288,6 279,1 246,9 237,3 242,3
Netherlands 100,0 94,9 83,5 84,2 79,9 69,6 69,7 79,5 90,3 100,1 99,5 83,1 65,1 63,4 63,1 69,7
New Zealand 100,0 94,4 105,2 156,8 224,8 302,9 294,0 319,4 276,2 254,7 228,9 183,3 191,0 141,0 118,0 138,2
Norway 100,0 101,9 102,9 106,1 104,9 100,9 119,2 141,0 142,3 149,5 153,6 148,5 141,9 129,7 140,8 157,6
Portugal 100,0 128,8 141,0 150,0 167,2 148,7 108,5 98,4 90,9 105,5 101,7 116,6 124,1 127,9 122,6 113,5
Republic of Korea 100,0 110,6 124,3 142,8 167,9 177,1 178,8 185,4 232,7 238,8 252,7 301,2 353,6 376,1 395,8 446,9
Spain 100,0 98,7 101,9 110,7 108,4 95,5 101,3 93,5 77,5 70,0 60,4 54,6 50,5 44,1 37,3 35,5
Sweden 100,0 88,3 89,7 92,2 101,2 106,5 106,5 111,8 117,2 133,0 140,8 143,8 134,4 127,3 137,5 138,6
Switzerland 100,0 97,5 95,0 94,0 77,8 76,7 82,4 97,9 114,0 132,7 159,2 164,2 184,6 174,0 182,1 194,2
United Kingdom 100,0 86,4 97,5 123,6 135,1 103,7 77,3 62,9 64,7 66,6 61,2 52,8 50,3 49,1 53,1 58,5
United States 100,0 94,6 106,7 122,0 119,5 93,0 103,9 115,4 131,9 143,3 129,8 125,5 112,4 120,4 155,7 170,2  
 
Volume Index of Social Capital. 1970=100. (Continuation) 
 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Australia 70,7 70,5 80,8 96,3 91,7 74,0 69,8 68,7 81,1 94,8 96,9 96,7 110,2 125,0 141,3 138,0
Austria 174,5 174,3 187,0 201,3 205,9 204,8 205,9 198,6 229,6 233,5 224,3 231,0 226,4 238,9 249,1 244,9
Belgium 99,8 105,9 115,8 132,9 143,4 135,9 125,5 115,2 112,1 116,9 119,5 113,2 119,2 124,1 137,3 134,9
Canada 229,8 244,1 272,7 293,3 298,4 273,5 278,8 302,2 335,2 357,9 371,8 414,8 443,2 465,2 518,0 519,5
Denmark 92,7 83,7 75,8 65,5 60,3 57,8 51,2 39,8 47,8 50,9 54,2 60,3 71,7 67,3 72,5 74,5
Finland 169,3 203,5 264,4 360,8 421,5 327,1 203,6 132,8 112,6 114,3 115,4 117,0 131,8 156,7 158,8 189,9
France 90,9 91,1 96,4 102,9 112,7 110,7 104,5 94,7 90,7 98,5 95,9 97,5 104,5 114,0 130,4 143,5
Germany 132,1 138,1 139,3 149,0 179,3 180,9 169,9 161,4 159,2 169,4 169,5 163,6 181,1 195,3 208,5 205,7
Greece 156,6 194,3 187,3 204,3 210,9 176,9 170,9 188,1 176,3 171,4 160,5 157,2 144,7 157,8 180,9 206,8
Ireland 58,8 59,5 63,2 69,1 91,2 77,3 83,0 74,4 87,1 107,2 116,1 148,4 204,7 296,6 381,1 418,4
Italy 87,6 83,2 84,0 87,1 94,3 105,0 115,9 114,9 103,0 92,4 90,9 89,5 90,4 98,8 110,6 123,1
Japan 167,5 178,5 197,1 218,7 234,8 235,1 239,9 233,8 223,4 220,6 216,7 218,6 209,6 208,3 212,1 208,0
Luxembourg 265,3 275,4 298,6 316,9 375,6 366,0 422,7 416,1 416,8 468,2 429,9 423,8 465,3 492,2 558,2 623,2
Netherlands 77,2 94,3 100,0 107,2 116,6 125,3 132,9 143,7 137,9 145,9 164,5 199,8 252,4 305,9 335,2 359,3
New Zealand 146,1 136,4 106,2 80,9 70,1 60,8 64,7 66,5 78,5 100,7 108,3 114,2 113,0 128,9 140,3 149,0
Norway 232,0 279,6 294,2 307,1 416,9 376,0 374,8 348,6 371,4 396,7 408,9 451,7 511,8 442,9 323,1 251,8
Portugal 106,7 119,9 134,5 136,3 149,1 167,7 177,2 160,5 148,7 149,5 159,8 176,8 243,1 313,5 396,8 416,7
Republic of Korea 483,7 574,2 625,1 747,2 855,7 920,1 935,4 924,2 1.048,8 1.149,8 1.296,0 1.415,3 969,1 1.143,5 1.635,5 1.827,13
Spain 36,7 42,0 48,1 56,9 63,4 63,7 56,1 43,8 43,3 46,9 50,0 56,2 66,7 87,4 106,3 141,7
Sweden 148,0 164,0 187,8 212,4 204,5 173,6 124,6 99,3 108,9 122,8 118,8 124,3 159,0 173,4 217,9 -
Switzerland 203,3 220,2 236,4 264,5 272,8 238,5 206,2 184,6 186,4 196,6 188,3 183,7 195,5 217,6 222,7 220,4
United Kingdom 66,8 73,1 95,6 127,1 137,2 116,8 102,5 95,5 104,0 120,0 131,0 145,9 157,9 168,5 193,9 220,0
United States 189,2 216,6 236,4 241,8 231,8 203,2 192,0 206,0 228,8 254,8 259,3 282,8 320,1 349,6 391,8 369,7  
 
Source: Own elaboration from statistical sources in Appendix 3. 
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